Vertical externalities, changes in one level of government's policies that affect the budget of another level of government, may lead to non-optimal government policies. These externalities are associated with tax bases that are shared or "co-occupied" by two levels of government. Here we consider whether the co-occupancy of tax bases is desirable. We examine the optimal extent of the tax bases of a lower level of government (local) and a higher level (state). While we find that it is not optimal to have co-occupancy in the absence of other corrective policies, eliminating co-occupancy does not eliminate fiscal externalities, meaning that tax rates can still be above or now below the socially-optimal levels. Elimination of co-occupancy is not a substitute for a policy such as intergovernmental matching grants which directly eliminates fiscal externalities. We show that if policies are available that eliminate fiscal externalities, co-occupancy will, in fact, be desirable.
Introduction
While the concept of a "horizontal" fiscal externality arising from "tax competition" among governments at the same level has been the topic of numerous papers in the past twenty-five years 1 only relatively recently have "vertical" fiscal externalities come to attention of researchers beginning with Johnson (1988) and Flowers (1988) and continuing with Dahlby (1994 Dahlby ( , 1996 Dahlby ( , 2001 , Boadway and Keen (1996) , Boadway, et. al. (1998) , Keen (1998) , Hoyt (2001) , Dahlby and Wilson (2003) , Wrede (1996 Wrede ( , 2000 , Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) , and Wilson and Janeba (2005) among others.
As the name "vertical" implies, these externalities arise between governments at different levels, for example, between state and local governments or federal and state governments. In this case the focus is on the "overlap" in the tax bases of two levels of government. An example from Dahlby (1996) is the excise tax placed on cigarettes by both the federal and state governments in the United States. When choosing its tax rate, each state presumably only considers the tax's impact on its own revenues and ignores the impact on the revenues of other states and the federal government. As a result of an increase in the state's tax rate, other states' tax revenues will increase because of cross-border shopping (a horizontal externality) and federal tax revenues will be reduced because of the reduction in the cigarettes purchases, part of their tax base (a vertical externality). Because of these impacts on the revenues of other governments, the cost of funds perceived by the state differs from the social cost of the funds. While the horizontal fiscal externality is positive, the vertical externality is negative as increases in the state tax reduce federal revenues. Because the state government ignores this negative externality, it will overtax cigarettes.
A number of studies have considered policies by the higher level of government to correct for the vertical externalities created by taxes imposed by the lower level of government. Corrective policies include separating the tax bases of the two levels of government (Flowers, 1988) ; increasing the number of lowerlevel governments (Keen (1995) ; Keen and Kotsogiannis (2004) ); and providing intergovernmental grants (Dahlby (1996) ; Boadway and Keen (1996) ; Boadway, et. al., (1998); and Flochel and Madies, (2002) ).
With the exception of a few studies including Dahlby (1996) , Keen (1998) , Hoyt (2001) , Dahlby et. 2 al. (2000) , and Dahlby (2001) vertical fiscal externalities have been examined in the context of a single tax base, generally labor income, shared or "co-occupied" by two different levels of government. Of course, this is a simplification as in most countries governments rely on a number of different tax bases and instruments. While we also examine tax policies in a hierarchical system of governments, we depart from previous studies in a several respects. First, rather than considering vertical externalities when a single tax base serves as the source of revenue for both levels of government (state and local), we consider vertical externalities with multiple tax bases. Specifically, we consider a large number (a continuum) of commodities to be included in either or both of levels of governments' tax bases. The consideration of multiple commodities enables us to address the question of central interest to this paper --how should the tax base be allocated between the two levels of government?
Vertical fiscal externalities act in both directions --state taxes affect local revenues and local taxes affect state revenues. Flowers (1988) , Keen (1995) , Wrede (1996) , and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) , for example, assume that both levels of government ignore the vertical externality imposed on the other level of government when setting tax policies. This leads to excessive taxation at both levels of government. 2 Here, as we wish to consider what limitations state governments should impose on the commodities included in both state and local tax bases, we assume that the state government considers the impact of its tax policies on local revenues.
In addition to having multiple tax bases, different levels of governments rely on very different sources of revenue. While there is only limited overlap or "co-occupancy" in sources of revenue of state and local governments in the United States, for example, there is likely to be a strong link between their alternative tax bases. Changes in a major source of state revenue such as the personal income tax will undoubtedly affect revenues from the property tax, a major local source of revenue. In contrast, there is much more apparent co-occupancy of the federal and state tax bases primarily because the personal income tax and, to a lesser extent, the corporate income tax are major sources of tax revenue for both levels of government. Thus, while vertical fiscal externalities will almost certainly arise in a co-occupied tax base, it does not follow that eliminating co-occupancy eliminates fiscal externalities, an idea that may underlie the recommendation by some to eliminate co-occupancy. In fact, eliminating co-occupancy may change the fiscal externality from being negative to being positive if the commodities in the two tax bases are substitutes. This, in turn, would suggest under-taxation rather than over-taxation.
The issue addressed here, what level of government should tax what goods or services or inputs is referred to in the federalism literature as the "assignment" problem. In a surprisingly small literature, the best known discussion of the appropriate assignment of the tax base in a system of hierarchical governments is found in Musgrave (1983) with nice summaries in Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) , Oates (1994) , Keen (1998) and Dahlby (2001) . While Musgrave provided some general guidelines for assigning tax bases based on the elasticity of alternative tax bases, he does not discuss how vertical fiscal externalities might affect assignment. Keen (1998) does devote some discussion (and analysis) to co-occupancy and assignment by addressing the question of whether it is better to co-occupy an inelastic tax base or a more elastic tax base. Dahlby (2001) raises several concerns with Musgrave's rules for assignment including the issue of co-occupancy. While not presenting any formal model, Dahlby (2001) , by highlighting the general interdependency of tax bases, raises questions similar to those we address here.
Here we address the assignment question using a very different framework from those in either Musgrave (1983) or Keen (1998) but similar in many ways to the framework implicit in Dahlby (2001) .
Rather than considering the type of tax base that should be taxed by different levels of government, we consider how to divide a uniform tax base among two levels of government and whether co-occupancy is desirable or not. This framework, we believe, helps focus on the question of whether the existence of vertical fiscal externalities might, as suggested by Flowers (1988) and Dahlby (2001) among others, lead to the conclusion that there should be no or very limited co-occupancy among tax bases. Even when the elimination of co-occupancy may be optimal, it does not, in general, eliminate vertical fiscal externalities. As a 4 consequence, even if co-occupancy is eliminated the tax rates of the two levels of government will not be optimally set. If the commodities in the tax base are gross substitutes, eliminating co-occupancy results in a positive fiscal externality, meaning that tax rates will become "too" low. Here, because both the tax rates and tax bases of governments are policy instruments, we need to distinguish between fiscal externalities associated with changes in a government's tax rate and one associated with changes in its tax base. While the division of the tax base obviously influences the vertical externalities associated with the tax rates, the extent and direction of the fiscal externalities associated with tax increases and those associated with increases in tax bases can be quite different. Elimination of co-occupancy is social-welfare improving because of the fiscal externalities associated with the tax base and not those associated with the tax rates. In fact, eliminating co-occupancy will not, in general, eliminate vertical fiscal externalities.
While we show that it is not desirable to allocate the tax base among the two governments to eliminate the fiscal externalities from taxes, elimination of these fiscal externalities using other instruments will dramatically change the optimal structure of the two governments' tax bases. If matching grants are used to eliminate the vertical fiscal externalities associated with the tax rates, social welfare is maximized only when both governments tax all commodities, that is, the entire tax base is co-occupied; if the state government can differentially tax (or subsidize) commodities, part of the tax base will be co-occupied and part is exclusively taxed by the state. With either of these policies the state government is able to equate both the marginal rates of substations for the public services of the two levels of government and optimally tax all commodities. Thus the policy of eliminating co-occupancy is only desirable if the fiscal externalities associated with tax rates cannot be eliminated using other instruments.
Our basic model is found in Section 2. In Section 3 we consider the tax rates and tax bases that would independently be chosen by both levels of government if they were provided the opportunity to do so.
The optimal tax base for the different levels of government is considered in Section 4. In this section we first consider the question of how to divide the tax base between the two levels of government in the absence of any overlap. We then consider whether and under what conditions, would co-occupancy be socially optimal.
In Section 5, we briefly discuss how the tax base should be allocated if the state government uses matching 5 intergovernmental grants or differential taxation to eliminate the fiscal externalities associated with the taxes. Section 6 considers extensions and concludes.
A Simple Model of Optimal Tax Base Division
We consider an economy with a single state government and n local governments. All localities have a single, identical resident. Each government provides public service to its residents with gs being the level provided by the state government and gj, j = 1,…, n , the level provided by locality j. Both public services are produced with constant costs with the cost of providing gs to the n localities equal to ngs and the cost of providing the local public service in locality j equal to gj, j=1,…,n. While there are n independent localities, each local government has the same policy objectives and instruments as well as identical residents. Then, in equilibrium, all localities will independently choose the same policies. Given this symmetry, we denote local policies by the subscript l and suppress notation referring to specific localities as much as possible. To further simplify the analysis, we also assume that the number of localities is large enough so that no individual locality considers the impacts its policies have on state revenues.
In addition to the public services, residents also consume private commodities. Following Wilson (1989), we consider a continuum of these private commodities identified on the interval [0,1]. We denote the gross of tax price of commodity i, x(i), by q(i). The net price of all commodities is unity. Since our interest is in how to divide the tax base between the two levels of government, we assume identical demand functions over the set of commodities. By this we mean that when the prices of two commodities are identical, the quantity demanded is the same for both. In addition, all commodities have the same own price and cross-price elasticities with respect to all other commodities. More formally,
where we denote these derivatives by ) (
. 3 In addition to this 3 This should be viewed as an approximate since commodities facing different prices will not have the same demand.
However, in the absence of any a priori information about the sign of
, this approximation greatly simp-6 continuum of commodities, there is a single untaxed commodity z. 4 For our purposes, an important implication of having identical commodities is that the optimal tax structure is extremely simple --all commodities should be taxed equally.
As the local governments and the state government assess uniform commodity taxes to finance their public services, the gross price of each commodity depends on whether it is part of the local government's tax base and/or the state government's tax base. The assumption of a single, uniform tax rate applied by the state is relaxed in Section 5. Localities tax the set of commodities on the interval [0, l k ] while the set taxed by the state government is on the interval [ s k ,1]. Let the length of the interval taxed only by the local government be denoted by kl and the length of the interval taxed only by the state government be denoted by ks. If ls kk  the length of the interval taxed by both governments is kls. Then the gross of tax price for the commodities can be summarized by
where τl and τs denote the local and state tax rates respectively.
As we assume the utility function is separable in private consumption and the two public services, the indirect utility function can be expressed as
, the sub-utility function with respect to prices, and the argument for z is suppressed as it is untaxed.
The objective function for the local governments is given by
(2.4)
As we assume that local governments ignore the impact of their policies on state revenues, we do not inlifies the analysis. While the specific formulation of some of the results would be somewhat modified if we relaxed this assumption, the conclusions obtained, as least qualitatively, are unaffected.
7 clude state public services as an argument in the local government's welfare function. For the state government we consider the objective function,
(2.5)
The state tax base in a locality is denoted by (2.6)
Externalities and the Endogenous Choice of Tax Base
In the United States, the choice of tax base, that is what local governments can tax, is not at the discretion of local government but instead determined by state governments. 5 While this may be the case, it is still useful to examine what tax base local governments would choose if given the option. Here we begin by considering the problem facing both the local governments and the state government when they can choose both their tax rate and tax base. Following this, we then consider the nature of fiscal externalities in this framework. 6 In addition to the externality generated by the local government's choice of tax rate, its choice of tax base generates an externality as well. Here, we assume that the local and state governments choose their tax rates and base in Nash equilibrium. This is done, in part, to emphasize the independence and lack of coordination between the two levels of government in this setting. In the next section, when we consider the outcome when the state government chooses both tax bases, we assume a Stackelberg equilibrium. Since all localities have the same objective and the state must set the same tax rates in all localities, in this equilibrium all localities will have the same tax rate, l, and tax base, l k .
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The Governments' Objectives
Each locality maximizes its residents' welfare by choosing both its tax rate and tax base given the tax rates and bases of the other localities and the state government. Then formally the local government's problem is
is defined by the government budget constraint, (2.6). In a symmetric equilibrium the welfare-maximizing local tax rate and base satisfy the conditions,
. The impact of an expansion of the tax base depends on whether the tax bases overlap ( ls kk  ) or not. In the absence of an overlap, the addition of commodity l k adds xl to the local base; when the bases overlap, the expansion of the base adds xls to the local base. Of course, adding commodity x( l k ) to the local tax base increases its price by τl. This price increase will affect the demands for the other kl + kls commodities in the local base and therefore the revenues collected from these commodities.
Unlike the local governments, the state government chooses its policies accounting for their impacts on local revenues. Formally, the problem the state government is facing is
Then in the Nash equilibrium, the state's tax rate and base must satisfy the first order conditions, 
Using these first order conditions we can determine the tax bases chosen by the two levels of government. As we are considering the optimal tax base for a local government given it also chooses its optimal tax rate, we use (3.2a) with (3.2b) to obtain
(3.5b)
Expression (3.5a) gives the marginal increase in local welfare from an expansion in its tax base when there is no overlap while expression (3.5b) gives it when the two governments' tax bases overlap. In both cases, local welfare always increases as the local tax base expands. This result should not be surprising as the local government ignores the impact expansions of its base have on state tax revenues.
Because the local government will tax the entire base if given this option, we need only evaluate the state government's choice of tax base when 1  l k to determine the equilibrium tax bases. The increase in social welfare from an increase in the state tax base can be obtained by using the first order condition for the state tax rate, (3.4a), in the first order condition for the state tax base, (3.4b . That the impacts of state and local expansions are symmetric despite the differences in their objectives arise because the state government sets its tax rate to internalize its impact on local revenues. By doing this, the state ensures the impact of expanding its tax base on local government revenues is internalized as well. In Proposition 1 we briefly summarize these results:
Proposition 1: Assume both the local and state governments independently choose their tax bases. a)
Then the equilibrium tax bases are such that both levels of government tax the entire tax base,
In equilibrium, MRSs > MRSl.
That the marginal rate of substitution for the state public service will always exceed that for the local public service is a result of the fact that the state government considers the impact its taxing decision have on 10 local revenues while local governments do not.
Optimal Tax Base Division and Co-Occupancy
As shown in the preceding section, both levels of government will tax the entire tax base if given the option. Changes in the local governments' tax bases as well as their tax rates will generate fiscal externalities. Here we address the question of the social-welfare maximizing division of the tax base between the two levels of government is optimal. We first address the question of how the tax base should be divided between the two levels of government if there is to be no co-occupancy. After deriving the optimal division of the tax base, the question of whether the state and local governments should share tax bases, that is, whether there should be any overlap in the two tax bases is then addressed. We examine the division of the tax base in the context of a Nash equilibrium in which the state chooses its tax rate and the division of the tax base and the local governments are choose their tax rates.
Before formally examining the problem of how to divide the tax base between the two levels of government in the absence of co-occupancy, consider what might characterize the "ideal" division of the tax base. This division would yield what might be considered the "unified" outcome, achieved when a single government (state) finances both services and can set any tax rate it desires on the commodities.
Because all commodities have the same own-price and cross-price elasticities, the tax rates levied by the two levels of government should be equal to ensure equal taxation of all commodities. Since the marginal cost is the same for the two public services, their marginal rates of substitutions should also be equal. As we show, with the two governments independently setting taxes and public services, this "ideal" outcome having both l = s and MRSl = MRSs is generally not obtainable. Then with this ideal outcome generally unobtainable in the absence of co-occupancy, the possibility that co-occupancy might, in fact, be optimal should not be dismissed immediately.
The Optimal Division of the Tax Base in the Absence of Co-occupancy
Given the tax rates chosen by the local governments, the problem facing the state government determining the optimal division of the tax base as well as its tax rate is
where the state government, by choosing the extent of the local tax base, determines the extent of its tax base as well. In the symmetric equilibrium, the first order condition for (4.1) with respect to the tax base can be expressed as (4.2a) and the first order condition with respect to the state tax rate can be expressed as
where the reaction functions . However, if x21 > 0, the division of the tax base will affect the marginal cost of funds and there is no division of the tax base for which both the tax rates and the marginal rates of substitution can be equated. Less obvious, however, is how the optimal division of the tax base might be characterized when x21 > 0. We begin by considering the relationship between the two tax rates and marginal rates of substitution when the tax base is evenly split and MRSl < MRSs, we increase the tax base for the level of government with the higher tax rates and marginal rate of substitution for its public service. Part c) of the Proposition states that with 0 21  x it will never be optimal for one level of government to have both a higher tax rate and relative under-provision of a public service.
Finally, we might consider whether the elimination of co-occupancy of the tax base leads to social-welfare maximizing tax rates for the two levels of government. Differentiating the social welfare function with respect to the tax rate of a single locality gives
(4.4)
The impact on social welfare depends on the change in the state tax revenue An increase in revenue increases social welfare; a decrease will decrease social welfare. Then it follows that:
Proposition 4: Assume that the tax base is optimally divided between the two governments. Then at the optimal division: a) If x21 = 0, a (marginal) change in the local tax rate has no impact on social welfare; b) if x21> 0, an increase in the local tax rate will increase social welfare; c) if x21<0, a decrease in the local tax rate will increase social welfare.
Only if the cross-price elasticities between commodities equal zero are the local tax rates welfare maximizing. This is because elimination of the co-occupancy eliminates the fiscal externality in this case.
With non-zero cross-price elasticities, eliminating co-occupancy does not eliminate the fiscal externality.
In the case of gross substitutes, it may change the fiscal externality from being negative with co-occupancy to being positive with no co-occupancy. This, in turn, means that taxes also change from being "too" high to being "too" low, below the welfare maximizing rates.
The Optimal Co-Occupancy of Tax Bases
That the tax rates and marginal rates of substitutions for the public services are not equal for the two levels of government and tax increases or decreases can enhance social welfare suggests the possibility that co-occupancy could be desirable. Formally, the state's problem is to choose the tax bases for both levels of government   
where we use 1x11  xsxls and xl+sxll  xls to obtain (4.6). Term (a) in both (4.6a) and (4.6b) gives the increase in welfare from expanding the tax base to an untaxed commodity. Term (b) in both expressions
gives the impact of expanding the overlap in tax bases on revenue. The first order condition with respect to the state's tax rate remains (3.4a).
Our interest is in the impact of an expansion of the tax base of either level of government when there is no co-occupancy (kls=0) and the tax base is optimal divided between the two governments. Given an optimal division of the tax base, term (a) in (4.6a) equals term (a) in (4.6b) since the condition describing the optimal division of the tax base, (4.2), is simply term (a) from (4.6b) subtracted from term (a) in (4.6a). Then given term (b) is the same in both equations, it must be the case that if an increase in the local tax base will increase social welfare when the tax base is optimally divided, so must an increase in the state tax base. Using the first order condition for the local tax, (3.2a), in (4.6a) and evaluating at kls = 0
we can express l k W as:
(4.7a)
Using the first order conditions for the state taxes, (3.4a), in (4.6b) gives
(4.7b)
Term (a) of both (4.6a) and (4.6b) are both negative. While term (b) of (4.7a) is positive if τl > τs term (b) of (4.7b) will be negative in this case; if τs > τl, term (b) of (4.7b) will be positive but term (b) of (4.7a) must be negative. Then it follows that both (4.7a) and (4.7b) cannot both be positive and therefore co-occupancy, through increases in either tax base cannot be optimal when (4.2) is satisfied. Summarizing:
Proposition 5: Co-occupancy of the tax base is never optimal if the tax base is optimally divided in the absence of co-occupancy, that is, if the division of tax base satisfies (4.2). 
which is less than the deadweight loss imposed by taxing one commodity at the higher rate. Of course, with two public services and two different taxes, we do not have equal tax rates or equal marginal rates of substitution but the same logic applies. Rather than subjecting some small share of the tax base to a very high tax rate (τs+τl) the state government, by choosing the division of the tax base between the two levels of government, can "spread" the tax increase (or decrease) on a much larger share of the tax base. Thus if increases in the local public service are needed (MRSl > MRSs) rather than overlapping a share of the tax base, the state could expand the local base and contract the its base as well as to adjust its tax rate to get it closer to those of the local governments.
One of the most interesting aspects of this result is that it is true regardless of the cross-price elasticities of the commodities and, consequently, the extent and direction of the vertical fiscal externality arising from tax increases. Of course, if x21 = 0, there is no vertical fiscal externality in the absence of cooccupancy and if x21 < 0 having or increasing the overlap in the two tax bases only serves to increase the negative fiscal externality, so the result is not unexpected in either of these two cases. However, if x21 > 0, then in the absence of any overlap a positive fiscal externality exists. Then co-occupancy could, in fact, eliminate any fiscal externality. This, too, is not optimal. Thus while many arguments for eliminating cooccupancy generally seem premised on the notion of eliminating a fiscal externality associated with the tax rates, eliminating co-occupancy is still desirable even if it increases a (positive) fiscal externality.
Optimal Tax Bases with Alternative Instruments
That co-occupancy of the tax base is not optimal means that an optimally designed tax base will not eliminate fiscal externalities. This, in turn, suggests there may be a role for the state to use additional fiscal instruments to reduce or possibly eliminate these externalities. The two instruments we briefly discuss here are the use of an intergovernmental grant and the use of different state tax rates on the co-occupied and the exclusive tax base of state government. With these additional instruments, we show that exclusive tax bases are no longer optimal. We ask "If intergovernmental grants or differential taxation are used, then, what should the optimal division of the tax base be?" If both public services were provided by a single unified government the result would be equal tax rates on all commodities and MRSs = MRSl.
We demonstrate that this outcome can be obtained with either the use of intergovernmental grants or differential state taxation. When intergovernmental grants are available this outcome is obtained only with full co-occupancy; when the state can use differential taxation, it is obtained with full co-occupancy of the local tax base but with the state exclusively taxing part of the base. misallocation of funds between levels of government and to force governments to internalize the fiscal externality. Another suggested policy and our focus is to reduce fiscal externalities by limiting the co-occupancy of the tax base.
We find that complete elimination of co-occupancy is optimal if the tax base is optimally divided in the absence of co-occupancy and other corrective policies are not available. This result is true regardless of the cross-price elasticities among commodities and whether or not the vertical fiscal externality is positive or negative. However, this policy generally does not lead to the governments setting social-welfare maximizing tax rates, thus suggesting that other corrective policies are still desirable. Further if other corrective policies, specifically matching grants or differential taxation (and subsidies) by the state government, are used to eliminate fiscal externalities then co-occupancy is, in fact, socially optimal to ensure equal taxation of commodities (the optimal tax policy in this model) and that both governments face the same marginal cost of funds.
One extension to consider is the question of which commodities should be included in each tax base when commodities are not identical and they do not have identical cross-price elasticities. This extension would bring the analysis in closer alignment with the framework for addressing the assignment problem underlying Musgrave (1983) . In a framework with collection costs, Wilson (1989) finds that when adding a commodity to the set of taxable commodities, it should be the strongest available substitute with the existing set of taxable commodities. Does a similar result apply here or does substitution with the tax base of the other government need to also be considered?
Other possible extensions merit further research. In the simple model presented here there were no horizontal fiscal externalities as there was no flow of tax base between different localities. Recent studies by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) , Wilson and Janeba (2005) and Flochel and Madies (2002) consider both vertical and horizontal fiscal externalities though not with multiple tax bases. Relatively simple adjustments to the model would provide the opportunity to consider how local and state tax bases should be designed when these externalities also exist. It would seem likely that commodities or tax bases that flow between localities ideally would not be included in local tax bases.
